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CRIMINAL LAW-DOES 18 U.S.C. § 666 APPLY TO THE CORRUPT
SOLICITATION OF POLITICAL SERVICES IN EXCHANGE FOR
MUNICIPAL JOBS?
United States v. Cicco (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
Bribery is defined as "the offering... of something of value for the
purpose of influencing the action of an official in the discharge of his or
her public or legal duties."' Its origins trace back to 2400 B.C. 2 Over
the years, government employees have participated in such activity by
accepting bribes in exchange for specified action.3 In order to curtail
bribery in both the public and private sector, Congress has enacted fed-
eral theft and bribery statutes. 4 However, for many years, these statutes
only allowed the United States to prosecute bribery successfully in two
ways: first, the United States could prosecute bribery that involved fed-
eral funds under federal control,5 and second, it could prosecute bribery
involving individuals who were federal employees. 6
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 191 (6th ed. 1990).
2. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES 5 (1984). One of the earliest examples of
bribery took place between Urukagina, king of Lagash and his god, Ningirsu. Id.
In return for Ningirsu's favor, Urukagina agreed, among other things, not to do
injustice to "the widow and the orphan." Id.
3. See id. at 417-18, 429-30, 576-77, 652-53, 679.
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 201 (bribery), 641 (theft) (1988).
5. See generally Daniel N. Rosenstein, Note, Section 666: The Beast in the Fed-
eral Criminal Arsenal, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 673, 674 (1990) (citing 18 U.S.C.
§§ 201, 641 and noting inadequacies under those federal statutes).
Section 641 states:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or knowingly converts to his
use or the use of another, or without authority, sells, conveys or dis-
poses of any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of the United
States or of any department or agency thereof, or any property made or
being made under contract for the United States or any department or
agency thereof; or
Whoever receives, conceals, or retains the same with intent to con-
vert it to his use or gain, knowing it to have been embezzled, stolen,
purloined or converted-
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both; ....
18 U.S.C. § 641.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 201. Section 201 covers prosecution of federal employees.
Id. To fall within the parameters of § 201, one must be a "public official or
witness." Id.; see also Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984) (defining
"public employee" as one with position of public trust with federal responsibili-
ties). The Dixson Court noted that the mere presence of some federal assistance
does not bring a local organization and its employees within the jurisdiction of
the federal bribery statute. Id. at 499; see also United States v. Yu, 954 F.2d 951
(1033)
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In response to these limitations on prosecution, in 1984 Congress
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 666 to supplement prior bribery statutes. 7 Under
§ 666, the government no longer has to establish a connection between
the federal government and the stolen property or bribed official.8
Rather, the federal government may obtain jurisdiction over employees
of an organization solely because the organization receives federal
funds. 9 This enhancement of federal authority has led one commenta-
tor to remark that Congress "enacted a general federal criminal statute
of potentially limitless scope and effect."' 0
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit tested the
scope of § 666 recently in United States v. Cicco.I The opinion did not
apply § 666 to a bribe per se, but rather to the solicitation of political
services in exchange for municipal jobs. 12 The distinction between such
solicitation and bribery per se is central to the Third Circuit's holding.' 3
The purpose of this Casebrief is threefold. First, after reviewing the
(3d Cir. 1992) (holding bribery of IRS agent falls within § 201), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 964 (1993).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1988) For the text of § 666, see infra text accompany-
ing note 37.
8. Id.
9. See id. § 666(b) (includes jurisdiction over any "organization, govern-
ment, or agency [receiving] in any one year period, benefits in excess of $ 10,000
under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee,
insurance, or other form of Federal assistance").
10. Rosenstein, Note, supra note 5, at 674.
11. United States v. Cicco, 938 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1991).
12. Id. at 442-43. For a full discussion of the facts of Cicco, see infra notes
18-34 and accompanying text.
13. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 442-43. The Supreme Court has decided a number
of cases concerning the legality of political patronage practices in a civil context.
See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion). In 1976, a di-
vided Court held that the discharge of low-level public employees based solely
upon political affiliation impermissibly burdens the exercise of employees' polit-
ical beliefs. Id. at 355. However, the Elrod court limited its holding to non-
policymaking positions, those with more limited and narrow responsibilities. Id.
at 367.
In 1980, the Court replaced the policymaker/non-policymaker distinction
with a new test. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980). It ruled that "[t]he ulti-
mate inquiry is not whether the label 'policymaker' or 'confidential' fits a particu-
lar position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance
of the public office involved." Id. at 518. The Third Circuit has interpreted this
test to mean that courts must decide on a case-by-case basis whether party affilia-
tion is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public
office involved. Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 520 (3d Cir. 1981).
Recently, the Supreme Court extended Elrod and Branti to all employment
decisions, including hiring, promotion, transfer and recall from layoff. Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 79 (6-3 decision), reh'g denied, 497 U.S.
1050 (1990).
Notably, while the Court may not have provided guidance on employee
party affiliations, many of the Court's decisions have described the role of pa-
tronage in American society. See, e.g., Branti, 445 U.S. at 522 (Powell,J., dissent-
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss4/18
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
facts of the Cicco case, this Casebrief will discuss the district court's hold-
ing.14 Second, this Casebrief will detail the Third Circuit's treatment of
Cicco.'5 Cicco is the first case to consider the compatibility of § 666 and
18 U.S.C. § 601, a statute addressing favoritism in federally-funded em-
ployment, and may set the tone for future decisions in other jurisdic-
tions. 16 Finally, this Casebrief will analyze the possible effect of Cicco on
future Third Circuit decisions.17
II. FACTS
The two defendants in Cicco were municipal officials in Guttenberg,
New Jersey. 18 The first defendant was Nicholas Cicco, the mayor of
Guttenberg. The second defendant was Vincent Tabbachino, a member
of the city council. 19 The federal government charged both defendants
with soliciting political services and loyalty in exchange for granting city
jobs.20 The jobs in question were assignments as "special police of-
ing) (recognizing long accepted history of patronage); Elrod, 427 U.S. at 353-55
(tracing legacy of patronage back to era of Thomas Jefferson).
At the trial level in Cicco, the district court explained the importance of
political patronage:
[Patronage] bears the endorsement of a long tradition of open, wide-
spread, and unchallenged use that dates back to the beginning of the
Republic .... Such a venerable and accepted tradition is not to be laid
on the examining table and scrutinized ....
I will not describe at length the claim of patronage to landmark
status as one of our accepted political traditions .... Suffice it to say
that patronage was, without any thought that it could be unconstitu-
tional, a basis for government employment from the earliest days of the
Republic until Elrod - and has continued unabated since Elrod, to the
extent still permitted by that unfortunate decision.
United States v. Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 26 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1990) (quoting
Rutan, 497 U.S. at 96 (Scalia, J., dissenting)), vacated and remanded, 938 F.2d 441
(3d Cir. 1991).
14. For a discussion of the district court's holding, see infra notes 35-44
and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's holding, see infra notes 45-92
and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of § 601 and its compatiblity with § 666, see infra notes
78-92 and accompanying text.
17. For an analysis of the potential impact of Cicco, see infra notes 93-94 and
accompanying text.
18. Id. at 444. The town of Guttenberg is very small, with a population of
approximately 8,000 people. Tracy Schroth, Legal Costs Jump 1,000 Percent, N.J.
L. J., July 4, 1991, at 12. It is located west of New York City on the Hudson
River.
19. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 442.
20. Id. The government offered the following statement of Tabbachino as
an example of political patronage: "How could I support someone who is
against me, when someone who was with me was going to be passed up for
someone who was against me?" United States v. Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at
16-17 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1990), vacated and remanded, 938 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1991).
1992] 1035
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ficers," whose task was to assist the police department in their duties. 2 1
The assignments were for a one year term.2 2
The town's electorate was heavily Democratic, but in 1988, a Re-
publican, Andy Juncosa, made a strong challenge for a seat on the city
council. 23 That same year, Michael Postorino and Francisco Marrero
served as special police officers.2 4 Postorino and Marrero were both
friends ofJuncosa, but did not actively campaign for him in the Novem-
ber 1988 election. 2 5 In addition, the men did not canvass for Demo-
cratic incumbent Tabbachino. 26 Shortly after the election, the police
department told Postorino and Marrero that no work would be assigned
to them until they spoke to Mayor Cicco. 2 7
Cicco told Marrero that the city council was displeased with Mar-
rero and Postorino because they failed to actively support the Demo-
cratic slate in the election. 28 He then told Marrero that neither he nor
Postorino would be able to work as a special police officer until they
displayed party loyalty.2 9
Marrero revealed this information to Juncosa, the Republican chal-
lenger, and Juncosa set up a meeting with the prosecutor's office in
Hudson County, New Jersey.3 0 As a result of the meeting, the out-of-
work officers agreed to tape their next conversation with Cicco. 3 ' Dur-
ing that next meeting, the mayor outlined three reasons for dismissing
Postorino and Marrero: municipal cutbacks, Postorino and Marrero's
failure to actively support the Democratic slate in the November election
and reports that Postorino had threatened a Democratic campaign
worker.3 2 Postorino and Marrero recorded the entire conversation.33
In January 1989, the police department did not reappoint Postorino or
21. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 442-43. Although the district court focused on
Cicco's and Tabbachino's manipulations of the special police officer positions,
the court also noted that the defendants allegedly had caused school crossing
guard Thomas Oriolo to be fired because Oriolo's wife and son were running in
a primary against candidates supported by Cicco and Tabbachinao. Id. at 443.
Oriolo was rehired after he agreed to have his wife and son withdraw from the
election. Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 2.







29. Id. Cicco also told Marrero and Postorino that they would not be ap-
pointed as regular policeman until they showed loyalty to the party. United
States v. Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 2 (D.NJ. Oct. 5, 1990), vacated and re-
manded, 938 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1991).




[Vol. 37: p. 10331036
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Marrero as special police officers.3 4
III. THE DISTRICT COURT'S HOLDING
In Cicco, two counts of the indictment focused on 18 U.S.C. § 666.35
The district court concentrated on whether § 666 was applicable to the
facts in Cicco. 3 6 Section 666 provides in part:
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of
this section exists -
(1) being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local,
or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof -
(B) corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of
any person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything
of value from any person, intending to be influenced
or rewarded in connection with any business, transac-
tion, or series of transactions of such organization,
government, or agency involving any thing of value of
$5,000 or more;...
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10
years, or both.
(b) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this sec-
tion is that the organization, government, or agency receives, in
any one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Fed-
eral program involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guaran-
tee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance. 37
34. Id.
35. United States v. Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 14 (D.N.J. Oct. 5, 1990),
vacated and remanded, 938 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1991).
36. Id.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1988). Cicco is the first application of § 666 in the
Third Circuit. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 445-46. Before Cicco, less than a dozen federal
courts had applied the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Bordallo, 857 F.2d 519
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818 (1989) (refusing to apply § 666 to Gov-
ernor of Guam who allegedly accepted $79,600 in exchange for awarding gov-
ernment contracts because Guam is not a "state"); United States v. Smith, 659 F.
Supp. 833 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (holding that expenditures to which alleged bribes
are connected do not have to be traced to federal funds under § 666); United
States v. Sadlier, 649 F. Supp. 1560 (D. Mass. 1986) (applying § 666 where hos-
pital employee received kickbacks in exchange for referring hospital's purchases
of respiratory therapy supplies and equipment to corporation). The Third Cir-
cuit has addressed § 666 twice following the Cicco decision. See United States v.
Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding sentencing under Federal
Guidelines for § 666 violation not violative of due process); United States v.
Casoni, 950 F.2d 893 (3d Cir. 1992) (affirming § 666 convictions on evidentiary
issues).
The statute has also been applied in other circuits several times since Cicco.
See. e.g., United States v. Peery, 977 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S.
5
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At the trial level, the jury returned a guilty verdict on the two counts
of the indictment alleging violations of § 666.38 The district court, how-
ever, entered a post-judgment verdict of acquittal. 39 The court rea-
soned that, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the
evidence at the close of the government's case revealed an implied
promise by the defendants that Marrero and Postorino would be al-
lowed to keep their jobs if they demonstrated political loyalty and
granted services to the defendants' party. 40 The district court stated
that this implied promise took the activity outside of the scope of
§ 666.4 1
The district court supported this judgment of acquittal on two dif-
ferent grounds. First, the court determined that Congress did not in-
tend § 666 to apply to the defendant's actions. 4 2 Second, the court held
Ct. 1354 (1993) (affirming conviction of executive director of government com-
mission who stole approximately $800,000 of government funds); United States
v. Sanderson, 966 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming conviction of supervisor
who stole funds from sheriff's department). United States v. Mongelli, 794 F.
Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding "thing of value in § 666 can be intangible").
Section 666 is modeled after 18 U.S.C. § 665, which creates a federal of-
fense for acts of theft or embezzlement by an officer or employee of any agency
receiving assistance under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act
(CETA) or the Job Partnership Training Act (JPTA). Under the JPTA, the De-
partment of Labor distributes grants to the states to support programs for serv-
icing immigrant and seasonal farm workers. California Human Dev. Corp. v.
Brock, 762 F.2d 1044, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that Department of La-
bor's allocation of funds under JTPA was valid); see also Rosenstein, Note, supra
note 5, at 684.
38. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 443.
39. United States v. Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 14 (D.NJ. Oct. 5, 1990),
vacated and remanded, 938 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1991).
40. Id. at 16. The district court stated:
There was no evidence of any demands for payments, salary kickbacks,
or contributions of services with a readily ascertainable pecuniary
value. According to the government, political loyalty and services are
things 'of value' because the defendants put value on them, regardless
of whether the loyalty and services had any pecuniary value.
Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. This analysis centered on the legislative history of the statute. For a
discussion of the legislative history of § 666, see infra notes 60-77 and accompa-
nying text. In addition to consulting the legislative history, the district court also
considered a Supreme Court case, United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396
(1973), and decided that even though activity may fall within the literal terms of
a statute, the legislative history may lead the court to the conclusion that the
statute does not cover the activity in question. Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 17-
18.
The Enmons court affirmed the dismissal of an indictment under the Hobbs
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988). Enmons, 410 U.S. at 411. In Enmons, a union strike
against a public utility caused violence and sabotage. Id. Union officials were
subsequently indicted under the Hobbs Act. Id. The indictment in Enmons
charged that the officials:
would obtain the property of [the utility] in the form of wages and
other things of value with the consent of the [utility] .... such consent
1038
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that the government's interpretation of § 666 was unconstitutionally
vague and thus deprived the defendants of fair notice.4 3
The United States Government appealed the district court order ac-
to be induced by the wrongful use of actual force, violence and fear of
economic injury by [the officials] ... and the [officials] did commit acts
of physical violence and destruction against property owned by the
[utility] in order to force said Company to agree to a contract with Lo-
cal 22876 ... calling for higher wages and other monetary benefits.
Id. at 397-98.
The Hobbs Act provides in part:
(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs . . . commerce ... by ...
extortion ... or commits or threatens physical violence to any person
or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in viola-
tion of this section [is guilty of a crime].
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). Extortion was defined in the Hobbs Act as "the obtaining
of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence or fear or under color of official right." Id.§ 1951(b)(2). The Cicco court cited Enmons because even though the actions
charged in the indictment were within the literal terms of the Act, the court
found that the legislative history indicated that Congress did not intend the
Hobbs Act to apply to "the use of force to achieve legitimate labor end[s]."
Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 18 (citing Enmons, 410 U.S. at 401). The Cicco
court noted:
Even if the language and history of the Act were less clear than we have
found them to be, the Act could not properly be expanded as the Gov-
ernment suggests - for two related reasons. First, this being a crimi-
nal statute, it must be strictly construed, and any ambiguity must be
resolved in favor of lenity. Secondly, it would require statutory lan-
guage much more explicit than that before us here to lead to the con-
clusion that Congress intended to put the Federal Government in the
business of policing the orderly conduct of strikes. Neither the lan-
guage of the Hobbs Act nor its legislative history can justify the conclu-
sion that Congress intended to work such an extraordinary change in
federal labor law or such an unprecedented incursion into the criminal
jurisdiction of the States.
Id. (quoting Enmons, 410 U.S. at 411).
43. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 442. The rationale for providing notice is that crimes
must be clearly defined so individuals have fair warning of what is forbidden by
a statute. Notice ensures that a statute does not trap the innocent nor violate
due process of law. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of
Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 205 (1989).
The district court held that the requirement of fair notice also mandated the
strict interpretation of § 666. Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 22. The court
stated: "[A] fair warning should be given to the world in language that the com-
mon world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is
passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear."
Id. at 22 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931)). In adopt-
ing this reasoning, the district court stated:
[It is] especially inappropriate to construe an ambiguous criminal stat-
ute unfavorably to the defendant when the construction that is adopted
leaves the statute as unclear in its coverage as the bare statutory lan-
guage. The rule of lenity rests on the notion that people are entitled to
know in advance whether an act they contemplate taking violates a par-
ticular criminal statute, even if the act is obviously condemnable and
even if it violates other criminal statutes.
Id. at 22-23; see also Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 545 (1971) (establish-
7
Green: Criminal Law - Does 18 U.S.C. 666 Apply to the Corrupt Solicitati
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1992
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37: p. 1033
quitting Cicco and Tabbachino on the two § 666 counts. 4 4
ing test as whether person of ordinary intelligence is given fair notice by statute
that conduct is illegal).
Courts have applied the requirement of fair notice regardless of the serious-
ness of the underlying crime, and even in the most cruel circumstances. See, e.g.,
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (overturning conviction under fed-
eral criminal civil rights law because of lack of fair notice even though victim was
brutally murdered).
In Cicco, the district court concluded that application of § 666 to the polit-
ical patronage would deny defendants fair notice for the following reasons:
(1) Political patronage has a long history in American politics, and was
openly practiced;
(2) Prior to 1976, patronage firings did not even result in civil liability,
much less criminal liability; and
(3) Patronage practices are still legitimate where "the hiring authority
can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for
the effective performance of the public offices involved.
Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 23 (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518
(1980)).
44. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 442-43. The indictment alleged violations of 18
U.S.C. § 1341 (mail fraud) (Counts 1, 2 and 3); 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(l)(B) (cor-
rupt solicitation of political services in exchange for municipal jobs) (Counts 4, 5
and 6); 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (racketeering) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (punishment to
principal of crime against government) (Counts 7, 8, and 9); and 18 U.S.C.
§ 601 (deprivation of employment for political contribution) (Counts 10, 11 and
12). Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 2.
The trial court granted the motion for acquittal on Counts 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9
with respect to both defendants; granted the motion on Counts 6 and 12 with
respect to Tabbachino; denied the motion on Counts 10 and 11 with respect to
both defendants; denied the motion on Counts 3, 6 and 12 with respect to de-
fendant Cicco; reserved decision on Counts 4 and 5 with respect to both defend-
ants; and reserved decision with respect to Count 3 on defendant Tabbachino.
Id.
The court vacated its prior order denying Cicco's Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 29(a) motion for ajudgment of acquittal on Count 12. Id. at 2-
3. The trial court also entered an order memorializing the denial of both de-
fendants' Rule 29(a) motions for a judgment of acquittal on Counts 10 and 11,
and Cicco's Rule 29(a) motion on Count 6. Id.
The government may appeal from a district court judgment of acquittal en-
tered after a jury's guilty verdict. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 442 n.1. The Third Circuit
has previously stated that "[a]lthough not expressly enumerated in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731, judgments of acquittal are appealable under that section." Id. (quoting
United States v. Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 805 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1070 (1989)).
The district court, however, denied the defendants' motions for acquittal on
the other counts of the indictment. Id. Since a defendant can only appeal from a
final order of the district court, and "[final judgment in a criminal case means
sentence," the convictions on the other counts were not before the Third Cir-
cuit. Id. (citing Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937)). Thus, the
Cicco court limited its review to the portion of the district court's order granting
the defendant's motions with respect to the counts based on § 666. Id.
The Third Circuit applied plenary review to the district court's interpreta-
tion of § 666. Id. See generally Chrysler Credit Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 746 F.2d 200, 202 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying plenary review to statutory
construction).
Postorino and Marrero also brought a civil suit. They originally sought $6
million in damages, but settled with the town for $200,000. The settlement was
1040
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IV. THIRD CIRCUIT'S HOLDING
A. Introduction
Four elements must be present to comprise a violation of
§ 666(a)(1)(b): "1) corrupt solicitation;4 5 2) of anything of value;4 6 3)
with the intention of being influenced in connection with any transaction
of a local government or organization receiving at least $10,000 in fed-
eral funds annually; 4 7 4) where the transaction involves anything of
value of $5,000 or more."'48
B. The Doctrine of Lenity
To begin its analysis, the Third Circuit implicitly applied the doc-
trine of lenity to determine that the conduct in question was outside of
the scope of the statute. 49 The doctrine of lenity was originally adopted
by the judiciary of eighteenth century England. 50 The United States
Supreme Court has employed the doctrine of lenity in interpreting crim-
approved by the town council. Tracy Schroth, It's Not $6 Million, But It'll Do, N.J.
L.J., Aug. 15, 1991, at 12. In approving the settlement, the town council stated
that the suit is based on "doubtful and disputed claims," but should be settled to
avoid "a huge expenditure of taxpayers' monies in the defense and trial of the
lawsuit." Id.
45. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 444.
46. Id. The government argued that the requested political services were
"something of value." Brief for Appellant at 18, Cicco, 938 F.2d 441 (No. 90-
5947). The government stated: "If the defendants had solicited construction
work on their homes or a donation of $1,000 to their party, there would be no
question that the statute would apply. The fact that the 'thing of value' de-
manded was services for their political party does not preclude prosecution." Id.
Appellee Tabbachino's brief also focused on the definition of "something of
value." It stated:
The government, by its indictment, basically contends that a state of
mind, that is, a willingness to work for and be loyal to the Guttenberg
Democratic Party, amounts to "something of value" under the intend-
ment of Section 666. It clearly does not. To permit such an expansive,
indefinite and amorphous reading of the term would be to stretch the
statute beyond the constitutional breaking point.
Brief for Appellee Tabbachino at 12, Cicco, 938 F.2d 441 (No. 90-5927). Tab-
bachino further argued that "[tihe statute is a theft and bribery statute in the
traditional sense; and the term 'anything of value' as used in subsection (a)(1)(B)
of Section 666 means money or property having tangible pecuniary value." Id.
at 13.
The district court assumed arguendo that the political services sought by the
defendants were "things of value." Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 16. For a
discussion of the district court's basis for its holdings, see supra notes 35-44 and
accompanying text.
47. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 444.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 442. The Third Circuit expressly followed the lead of the district
court which had applied the doctrine of lenity in determining that the evidence
in this case did not fall within the ambit of "corrupt solicitation of things of
value." Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 14.
50. See Jeffries, supra note 43, at 198 ("Faced with a vast and irrational
9
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inal statutes. 5 1 When statutory language cannot be clearly interpreted
or is ambiguous, lenity compels a court to construe the statute in favor
of the defendants. 52 This rule is necessary because it implements the
principle of legality, which forbids the creation of crimes by the judici-
ary.53 Moreover, courts have previously applied the rule of lenity to
§ 666. 54
C. Express Language of § 666
The Third Circuit began its application of the doctrine of lenity by
interpreting the express language of the statute.5 5 The court found two
proliferation of capital offenses, judges invented strict construction to stem the
march to the gallows.").
51. See generally Edward L. Hammer, Note, A Functional View of the Rule of
Lenity: Does Theft or Misaddressed Mail Violate the Federal Mail Theft Statute, 58 FORD-
HAm L. REV. 215, 219-21 (1989) (discussing history of doctrine of lenity).
52. Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 491 (1984) (finding that rule of
lenity compels construction of statute in favor of criminal defendants where leg-
islative history fails to clarify statutory language); United States v. Batchelder,
442 U.S. 114, 121 (1981) (noting criminal statutes are resolved in favor of len-
ity); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (holding that "ambiguity
concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity")
(quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
Recently, in Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152 (1990), the United
States Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule of lenity:
In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the
particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole
and to its object and policy. Moreover, because the governing standard
is set forth in a criminal statute, it is appropriate to apply the rule of
lenity in resolving any ambiguity in the ambit of the statute's coverage.
To the extent that the language or history of [the statute] is uncertain,
this "time honored interpretive guideline" serves to ensure both that
there is fair warning of the boundaries of criminal conduct and that
legislatures, not courts, define criminal liability.
Id. at 158 (citations omitted). The narrow construction of criminal statutes "is
based upon a concern for individual rights that may be endangered by overly
expansive interpretations and the 'principle that the power of punishment is
rested in the legislative, not in the judicial department.' " Brief for Appellee
Cicco at 16, Cicco, 938 F.2d 441 (No. 90-5947) (quoting Dowling v. United
States, 473 U.S. 207, 213 (1985)).
53. Crandon, 494 U.S. at 158.
54. See United States v. Webb, 691 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(using doctrine of lenity in determining that organization did not receive
$10,000 in federal funds, and therefore did not fall within scope of § 666).
55. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 444; see also American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456
U.S. 63, 68 (1982) (indicating that starting point of statutory construction is ana-
lyzing express language of statute); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580
(1981) (noting that "[iun determining the scope of a statute, we look first to its
language"); Barnes v. Cohen, 749 F.2d 1009, 1013 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating that
starting point of statutory interpretation is language of statute itself), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1061 (1985). In Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917),
the Supreme Court stated:
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance,
be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain,
10
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reasonable ways to interpret the statute. First, the court stated that the
literal language of the statute encompasses corrupt solicitation of polit-
ical services in exchange for municipal jobs.56 The court also referred
to this activity as "political patronage."' 57 The court, however, also rea-
soned that a judge could read the express language of the statute as
being limited to offenses of theft or bribery. 58 The court found this am-
biguity troubling and turned to the legislative history of § 666 for
guidance. 59
and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the law making
body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it
according to its terms.
Id.
56. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 444. The fact that particular activity falls within the
literal language of the statute does not necessarily guarantee that the statute
covers such activity. See, e.g., Office of Personnel Management v. Richmond, 496
U.S. 414, 438 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Where necessary to effectuate
Congress' intent .. .this Court therefore often interprets the apparently plain
words of a statute to allow a claimant to obtain relief where the statute on its face
would bar recovery."); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534,
543 ("[E]ven when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but merely
an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy of the legislation as a
whole' this Court has followed that purpose, rather than the literal words."),
reh'g denied, 311 U.S. 724 (1940).
57. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 44; see also Hartman v. Board of Trustees of Commu-
nity College, No. 90C 5281, 1991 WL 24519, at *3-5 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 1991)
(college administrator threatened with "future action" if did not yield to admin-
istrators' requests for political patronage). In Cicco, the government attempted
to argue that the activity was "corrupt extortion," and not merely "political pa-
tronage." Brief for Appellant at 27-28, Cicco, 938 F.2d 441 (No. 90-5947).
58. United States v. Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 19 (D.NJ. Oct. 5, 1990),
vacated and remanded, 938 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1991). The district court noted that
"18 U.S.C. § 666 is entitled 'Theft or bribery concerning programs receiving
Federal funds,' suggesting that Congress was most concerned with theft and
bribery." Id. The court continued, "Nothing in the language of § 666 suggests
that Congress intended § 666 to apply to political patronage practices of local
governments. Clearly there is no explicit expression of congressional intent to
attack local political appointment processes that involve the solicitation of polit-
ical loyalty and party services." Id. The Third Circuit concurred in this evalua-
tion. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 445-46.
Other courts have limited the scope of § 666 through strict statutory con-
struction. See, e.g., United States v. Barquin, 799 F.2d 619-21 (10th Cir. 1986)
(holding Indian tribes or their business councils not included in ambit of § 666);
United States v. Jackowe, 651 F. Supp. 1035, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding in-
tent level of § 666 is equal to that required in bribery statute); see also Hammer,
Note, supra note 51, at 219-20 ("When the statutory language is ambiguous ...
the plain meaning rule does not govern and judicial interpretation is
required.").
59. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 444. Courts frequently turn to the legislative history
of a statute to aid in statutory interpretation. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns,
310 U.S. at 543 (noting that legislative history is persuasive evidence of purpose
of statute); see also Hammer, Note, supra note 51, at 220 ("If legislative history
removes ambiguity from the statute, judicial interpretation must be in accord
with legislative intent." (citing 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 45.05, at 20-22 (4th ed. 1984))).
11
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D. Legislative History of § 666
Congress enacted § 666 in 1984 as part of the Comprehensive
Crime Bill. 60 It was "designed to create new offenses to augment the abil-
ity of the United States to vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud and
bribery .... '-61 The Third Circuit noted Congress intended § 666 to fill
60. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 444. Among other things, the Comprehensive Crime
Bill of 1984 established the Federal Sentencing Commission and delegated to it
"broad authority to 'review and rationalize' the federal sentencing process."
United Sentencing Rules to Stress Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1987, at Al.
61. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 444 (emphasis added) (citing S. REP. No. 225, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3102, 3510); see also Cicco, No.
90-5947, slip op. at 20. The Senate Report expressly noted that Congress
wanted the new statutory provision to be interpreted "consistently with the pur-
pose of this section to protect the integrity of the vast sums of money distributed
through Federal programs from theft, fraud and undue influence by bribery." S.
REP. No. 225, supra, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3102, 3510.
Appellee Tabbachino's brief mentioned the instances in which the United
States Attorneys' Manual provisions determined that § 666 is appropriate. Brief
for Appellee Tabbachino at 14-15, Cicco, 938 F.2d 441 (No. 90-5927). The Man-
ual states:
Three types of offenses are denoted in section 666. Subsection (a)
prohibits the embezzlement, stealing, purloining, misapplication, ob-
taining by fraud or otherwise unauthorized conversion to one's own use
or that of another, of property having a value of $5,000 or more by an
agent, typically an employee, of an organization or of a state or local
government agency that receives $10,000 or more annually in federal
funds. Subsection (b), which also applies only to agent [sic] of state or
local government agencies or of organizations receiving $10,000 or
more annually in federal funds, prohibits them from soliciting or ac-
cepting a bribe because of their conduct in a transaction or matter of
their agency or organization involving $5,000 or more. Subsection (c)
applies to anyone, and proscribes the offering of a bribe for such a per-
son to an agent of an organization or of a state or local government
agency receiving $10,000 or more annually in federal funds. The maxi-
mum penalty is imprisonment for ten years and a fine of the greater of
$100,000 or twice the amount obtained, solicited, or given in violation
of the section....
The new section is designed to facilitate the prosecution of persons
who steal money or otherwise divert property or services from state and local gov-
ernments or private organizations - for example, universities, founda-
tions and business corporations - that receive large amounts of federal
funds. Under prior law, with minor exceptions, thefts from such gov-
ernments or organizations could be prosecuted only under the general
theft statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 641. Use of this statute was often pre-
cluded because title to the property stolen had passed from the federal
government before it was stolen or the funds were so commingled that
their federal character could not be shown. With respect to bribery,
there was a question whether 18 U.S.C. Section 201, which punished
corrupt payments to federal public officials, covers payments to a per-
son employed by a private or state organization receiving federal funds.
Id. (quoting UNITED STATES ATrORNEYS' MANUAL: 9-46.120 (1985) (emphasis ad-
ded)). The Tabbachino brief then noted that the Manual required all federal
prosecutors to consult with the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division
prior to using the bribery provisions of § 666. Id. at 15 (citing UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS' MANUAL: 9-46.133).
1044 [Vol. 37: p. 1033
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gaps not addressed in existing statutes, and not to cover activity already
addressed by a statute.62 The Third Circuit held that the design, object
and policy of § 666 revealed that Congress intended to protect federally
funded projects from financial corruption and mismanagement. 6 3 The
statute was not to be used as a weapon against local patronage practices,
an area already covered by § 601.64
Section 666 addresses particular deficiencies in the law. For exam-
ple, 18 U.S.C. § 665 makes theft or embezzlement by an employee of an
agency receiving assistance under the Job Training Partnership Act a
federal offense. 65 Prior to the enactment of § 666, however, there was
no general statute covering theft or embezzlement in agencies receiving
financial support from the federal government. 66 As a result, before
§ 666, thefts from these agencies could only be prosecuted under the
general theft of federal property statute, 18 U.S.C. § 641.67 In addition,
62. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 444-45; Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 19-20. The
legislative history of § 666 states:
With respect to theft, 18 U.S.C. § 665 makes theft or embezzle-
ment by an officer or employee of an agency receiving assistance under
the Job Training Partnership Act a Federal offense. However, there is
no statute of general applicability in this area, and thefts from other
organizations or governments receiving Federal financial assistance can
be prosecuted under the general theft of Federal property statute, 18
U.S.C. § 641, only if it can be shown that the property stolen is prop-
erty of the United States. In many cases, such prosecution is impossible
because title has passed to the recipient before the property is stolen,
or the funds are so commingled that the Federal character of the funds
cannot be shown. This situation gives rise to a serious gap in the law,
since even though title to the monies may have passed, the Federal
Government clearly retains a strong interest in assuring the integrity of
such program funds. Indeed, a recurring problem in this area (as well
as in the related area of bribery of the administrators of such funds) has
been that State and local prosecutors are often unwilling to commit
their limited resources to pursue such thefts, deeming the United
States the principal party aggrieved.
Cicco, 938 F.2d at 445 (quoting S. REP. No. 225, supra note 61, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3510).
"[Tihe purpose of [18 U.S.C. § 666] is to protect the integrity of the vast
sums of money distributed through Federal programs from theft, fraud and un-
due influence by bribery." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 225, supra note 61, reprinted in
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3511); see also United States v. Sadlier, 649 F. Supp.
1560, 1563 (D. Mass. 1986) (noting that § 666 augments other statute and does
not impliedly repeal it).
63. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 445; Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 19.
64. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 445-46; Cicco, No. 90-5947, slip op. at 22. Appellee
Tabbachino's argued that the statute "has not been applied in the factual con-
text hereto attempted by the government. Indeed, the factual common denomi-
nator to all of the cases involving the statute is bribes, kickbacks and
embezzlements of monies." Brief for Appellee Tabbachino at 13, Cicco, 938 F.2d
441 (No. 90-5927).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 665 (1988).
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the government could prosecute under § 641 only if it could show that
the property stolen was property of the United States.68 Section 666
helps fill these gaps by covering a much broader set of employees. 6 9
Under § 666, even if the government loses or no longer has title to the
stolen property, it can still prosecute a defendant for theft or
embezzlement. 70
Section 666 also has filled gaps in other statutes such as 18 U.S.C.
§ 201, the primary bribery statute in effect at the time of the enactment
of § 666. Section 201 applies only to cases involving "public offi-
cials."' 7' Before the enactment of § 666, the courts of appeals were split
upon whether people employed by a private organization receiving federal
monies pursuant to a program were public officials. 72 Congress wanted
to ensure that officials of private organizations that received federal
funds came within the reach of the bribery laws. 7 3 Section 666 now
makes this the case.74
Therefore, the Cicco court concluded that the legislative history re-
vealed that Congress' purpose in enacting § 666 was to fill gaps in ex-
68. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1988).
69. For the pertinent text of § 666, see supra text accompanying note 37.
70. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 445.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
72. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 445 (emphasis added) (citing S. REP. No. 225, supra
note 61, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3510). The legislative history
makes specific reference to United States v. Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659 (2d Cir.
1976). The Cicco court explained the importance of Loschiavo, stating:
[T]he government charged Loschiavo with bribing a public official in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201. Loschiavo had paid off Morales, the Dep-
uty Director of the Harlem-East Harlem office of the New York Model
Cities Administration, in order to obtain from Model Cities a lease on a
building he owned. The evidence showed that the federal government
paid 80 per cent of Morales' salary and 100 per cent of the costs of
program he was administering. A jury found Loschiavo guilty of brib-
ing a public official.
The court of appeals vacated the conviction. The court concluded
that Morales was not a federal "public official" within the meaning of
the statute because "he was not acting 'under or by authority of any ...
department, agency or branch of [the federal] Government'." The
court explained:
The type of public project involved, or the amount of federal
funding entailed, may be important in applying other parts of the
statute, . . . but for the purpose of deciding Morales' status as a
"public official" under § 201(a), it is not the aspects of the particu-
lar project which are of the greatest significance, but the character
and attributes of his employment relationship, if any, with the fed-
eral government.
Cicco, 938 F.2d at 445 (citing S. REP. No. 225, supra note 61, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182 (quoting Loschiavo, 531 F.2d 659)). Therefore, the federal
government was not able to prosecute private agency employees who took kick-
backs in return for awarding government contracts.
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isting legislation, not to cover a crime such as political solicitation in
exchange for municipal jobs, an activity already covered under existing
statutes. 75 The court concluded that the statute did not apply to elected
city officials such as Cicco and Tabbachino. 76 Because the Third Circuit
determined that Congress did not intend for § 666 to apply to the pres-
ent case, it did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the
statute.
77
E. Analysis of § 601
Although the Cicco court rejected the government's attempt to pros-
ecute the defendants under § 666, it found that § 601 encompassed the
activity alleged in Cicco.78
The Cicco court is the first court to compare and analyze § 666 and
§ 601. 79 Two counts of the indictment were based on § 601, and the
government obtained convictions against both defendants on those
counts. 80 Section 601 states:
(a) Whoever, directly or indirectly, knowingly causes or at-
tempts to cause any person to make a contribution of a thing of
value (including services) for the benefit of any candidate or
any political party, by means of the denial or deprivation, or the
threat of the denial or deprivation, of -
(1) any employment, position, or work in or for any
agency or other entity of the Government of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State, or any
compensation or benefit of such employment, position, or
work; or
(2) any payment or benefit of a program of the United
States, a State, or a political subdivision of a State;
if such employment, position, work, compensation, payment or
benefit is provided for or made possible in whole or in part by
an Act of Congress, shall be fined not more than $10,000, or
imprisoned not more than one year, or both. 8 1
75. Id.
76. Id. at 445-46.
77. Id. at 444.
78. Id. at 446.
79. Id. at 445.
80. Id. Count 12 charged both defendants with violations of § 601. Id.
The district court granted Tabbachino's motion for acquittal with respect to the
count, but denied Cicco's motion. The jury found Cicco guilty. Id. at 445 n.3.
The Third Circuit, however, vacated the district court's decision to deny Cicco's
motion for judgment of acquittal on count 12 and granted the motion because
the government was not able to establish jurisdiction under § 666. Id. at 444.
For a discussion of the jurisdictional requirements under § 666, see supra note 9
and accompanying text.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 601 (1988).
19921 1047
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The Third Circuit noted that § 601, enacted to prohibit partisan fa-
voritism in federally-funded employment, is not mentioned in the legis-
lative history of § 666.82 The court concluded that "Congress enacted
§ 666 to remedy specific deficiencies in existing federal theft and bribery
statutes. When it did so, Congress made no suggestion that § 666 was
also designed to supplement § 601. Rather, Congress intended § 666 to
address different and more serious criminal activity." 8 3
The government, however, is often motivated to try defendants
under § 666 because the punishment under § 666 is ten times greater
than the punishment under § 601.84 Violations of § 666 are felonies,
while violations of § 601 are prosecuted as misdemeanors. 85 The Cicco
court determined that if Congress wanted § 666 to cover activity in-
cluded in § 601, and thereby change the classification of the crime, it
would have expressly stated so in either the statute or the legislative
history of § 666.86
The Third Circuit supported its conclusion with two theories. First,
if Congress had decided to dramatically increase the punishment for
specific activity, it would have debated the issue.8 7 This topic was not
discussed in any congressional debates. 88 Second, the legislative history
of § 666 does refer specifically to other related statutes, such as § 201,
§ 641, and § 645.89 The Third Circuit concluded that if Congress in-
tended to include the type of activity covered by § 601 in § 666, the
legislative history of § 666 would have specifically indicated this
intention. 90
After analyzing the case in the manner described above, the Third
Circuit vacated the order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the
counts of the indictment concerning § 666.9 1 Though agreeing in prin-
ciple with the district court's holding, the Third Circuit remanded the
case to implement a procedural correction. 92
82. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 446.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 601(a) (maximum imprisonment of one year),
666(a)(2) (maximum imprisonment of ten years).
85. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 446.
86. Id. at 444-46.
87. Id. at 446.
88. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 61, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3510-3511.
89. Section 666 addresses the following statutes in its legislative history: 18
U.S.C. § 201 (1988) (bribery of public officials and witnesses); 18 U.S.C. § 641
(1988) (embezzlement and stealing of public funds); 18 U.S.C. § 645 (1988) (il-
legal retention or conversion by court officers). Cicco, 938 F.2d at 446.
90. Cicco, 938 F.2d at 446.
91. Id.
92. Id. The Third Circuit corrected the district court's erroneous "order of
acquittal," which was granted after the jury's guilty verdict. Id. In doing so, the
Third Circuit stated that "an order of acquittal ... is appropriate only where the
court finds 'the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction.' " Id. The district
1048 [Vol. 37: p. 1033
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The Third Circuit addressed the compatibility of § 601 and § 666 as
an issue of first impression. The Cicco court definitively declared the
statutes' lack of synchronicity. Through the doctrine of lenity and an
examination of the legislative history, the Cicco court determined that
§ 666 does not encompass the corrupt solicitation of political services in
exchange for municipal jobs.9 3
In the Third Circuit, therefore, participation in such activity by gov-
ernment officials is not felonious. Because § 666 does not apply to the
solicitation of political services in exchange for municipal jobs, the gov-
ernment must continue to prosecute this type of activity under § 601. 9 4
The Third Circuit should be commended for its decision that recog-
nizes that a fine line exists between long accepted practices of political
patronage and activities considered illegal under § 666. A possible un-
intentional breaking of the law should be punished, but a felony penalty
for such activity would be inequitable.
Jay M. Green
court ruled as a matter of law that two counts of the indictment concerning
§ 666 were inappropriate, and the court of appeals agreed. Therefore, the dis-
trict court did not need to weigh the evidence. Id.
93. For a discussion of the court's holding that § 601 and § 666 do not
apply to the same offenses, see supra notes 55-92 and accompanying text.
94. For a discussion of the court's conclusion that § 666 does not apply to
the facts in Cicco, see supra notes 60-77.
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